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This paper sets out the distinctive harm caused and wrong done to child pornography victims. 
It presents a paradigm of reparation within a restorative justice framework that explains the 
significance of material reparation for these victims. The paper demonstrates that because of 
the particular nature of child pornography offences and the harms and wrongs occasioned, 
existing avenues for legal redress in England and Wales and the United States are generally 
inadequate and ill-fitting and that a new mechanism for effecting suitable reparation is 
required. It concludes by sketching a new mode of restorative justice for victims of child 
pornography, emphasising significant matters that must be addressed alongside financial 





The primary purpose of this paper is to suggest a novel approach to ensuring suitable 
reparation for child pornography victims in England and Wales and to reveal the 
shortcomings of existing avenues for redress under the current law. Its unique contribution is 
to formulate a new paradigm of reparation that reflects a restorative justice approach, 
understanding that the harm caused to child pornography (CP) victims is physical, 
psychological, emotional and ongoing. It argues that an appropriate mode of reparation must 
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recognise the symbolic significance of emphasising the wrong that offenders have committed 
against victims and take into account the collective responsibility of: abusers, those who 
create CP; those who distribute this material; and those who download it.1 It also lays out 
other matters which must be addressed in order to facilitate victims’ restoration in the broader 
context.   
 
Whilst others have explored what would constitute appropriate reparation and restitution 
for victims of sexual offences, by and large the existing literature has concentrated on contact 
sexual offending such as rape or child sexual abuse,2 with almost no exploration of this issue 
with particular regard to CP victims outside of the USA.3  However, ensuring appropriate 
reparation for victims of CP is a matter of both practical and theoretical significance. In 
practical terms it is important for at least three reasons. First, CP is an especially egregious 
form of wrongdoing, and the profundity of the harm it causes has the capacity to remain 
ongoing throughout a victim’s life. As discussed below, the image of a child being sexually 
abused is a permanent record of that abuse and, when the image is made available for others 
to download, the child’s privacy and dignity are subject to repeated infringement. The child’s 
awareness of the image and its availability to others can perpetuate their memory of the abuse 
                                                          
1 It should be noted at the outset that although the CP victim’s sexual abuse and its recording often occur in 
isolation from the distribution and downloading of the image(s) and may be perpetrated by different actors, the 
boundaries between creators and distributors can blur. For instance, one individual could be the abuser who 
creates the CP image and disseminates it. However, the creator could be a different individual from the 
distributor and, in most reported cases, the individuals who have downloaded images are not the child’s 
abuser. Consequently, this paper treats the abuser/creator, distributor and downloader as different individuals. 
2 See, e.g., B Hudson, ‘Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence’ (1998) 25 JLS 237; K 
Daly, ‘Sexual Assault and Restorative Justice’ in H Strang and J Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice and 
Family Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); A Cossins, ‘Restorative Justice and Child 
Sex Offences’ (2008) 48 Brit J Criminol 359; A-M McAlinden, ‘Restorative Justice as a Response to Sexual 
Offending: Addressing the Failings of Current Punitive Approaches’ (2008) 3 Sexual Offender Treatment 1.  
3 The sparse literature on this issue pertaining to the UK includes M Johnson, ‘Seeking Damages for Child 
Pornography’ (2011) 98 Personal Injury Law Journal 22; M Johnson and J Wheeler, ‘Abusive Images of 
Children and Compensation’ at http://www.boltburdonkemp.co.uk/articles/abusive-images-children-
compensation/ (last visited 9 December 2015). For literature relating to the position in the USA, see that 
referenced in Section 3(C) below. 
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and exacerbate their psychological harm.4 The harm suffered by CP victims should thus be a 
matter deserving of the most attentive scrutiny on the part of lawmakers and reformers, yet 
this paper demonstrates that existing avenues for redress are ill-designed to address this harm 
and it is not captured by traditional causation principles. Secondly, as explained below, CP is 
a social evil to which a surprisingly wide range of participants contribute.5 In other words, 
the distinctiveness of the crime in terms of both gravity and scale6 demands that proper 
attention be afforded to devising an appropriate mechanism for effecting suitable reparation. 
Finally, the matter of reparation for CP victims has so far received very little legislative 
attention despite the existence of important international obligations in this regard. A UN 
Optional Protocol requires State Parties to ‘take all feasible measures with the aim of 
ensuring all appropriate assistance to victims of such offences, including their full social 
reintegration and their full physical and psychological recovery’ and to ‘ensure that all child 
victims… have access to adequate procedures to seek, without discrimination, compensation 
for damages from those legally responsible’.7 These factors make the case for careful 
consideration of the salient issues all the more pressing.   
 
The theoretical significance of the present enquiry centres on the fact that reflection on the 
question of how best to make reparation for victims of CP will inform more general debates 
about restorative justice in the modern era. Put otherwise, some of the arguments advanced 
                                                          
4 See M Taylor and E Quayle, Child Pornography: an Internet Crime (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2003) p 24. 
5 See Taylor and Quayle, ibid, pp 4-5. 
6 See P Peachey, ‘National Crime Agency says system realistically can't prosecute all 50,000 child sex 
offenders’, The Independent, 20 October 2014. 
7 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography, A/RES/54/263, 25 May 2000, Article 9[3] and [4]. This Optional Protocol was signed 
by the UK on 7 September 2000 and ratified on 20 February 2009. Note also Article 20[2] of EU Directive 
2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, which 
requires Member States to ensure that child victims have access to legal counselling and to legal 
representation ‘including for the purpose of claiming compensation’. 
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below – such as the prioritisation of financial reparation for victims8 – are applicable to the 
question of how to ensure suitable reparation for victims of other crimes. The article does not 
rest upon an assumption that CP is a more serious crime than any other. However, whilst 
some of the arguments it advances could be applied to other victims of different crimes, 
particularly sexual contact offences and perhaps adult victims of ‘revenge porn’,9 it is argued 
through an application of restorative justice principles that CP causes a distinctive harm 
which demands a particular form of reparation. There has been an ongoing debate as to the 
merits and demerits of utilising restorative justice in sexual offence cases since the 1990s.10 
Drawing upon this debate, this paper steers away from initiatives that bring together offender 
and victim, such as conferencing, since it is argued that such schemes are inappropriate for 
CP victims, who may suffer more harm by being brought face to face with offenders. 
Moreover, because reparation for CP victims is the primary concern, the focus of the 
paradigm proposed is on restoring victims through material reparation rather than 
rehabilitating or reintegrating offenders.11 
 
This paper unfolds as follows: Section 1 sets out the physical and psychological harm and 
wrong caused (the violation of privacy and dignity and exploitation of the child’s abusive 
experience) to CP victims. It engages with literature on restorative justice in order to justify 
both the notion of harm adopted and the tailored approach to reparation that is subsequently 
advocated. Section 2 then proceeds to explain the significance of financial reparation for CP 
                                                          
8 G Davis, Making Amends: Mediation and Reparation in Criminal Justice (London: Routledge, 1992), pp 168-
171. 
9 Whilst adult victims of revenge porn may also suffer psychological harm if they are aware that their image is 
available for others to view and a violation of their privacy (see the discussion in the text accompanying n 123 
below), this paper is not directed towards adult pornography because of the distinction between child and adult 
pornography; the acts depicted in the former are criminalised since they are always considered to be harmful 
to the child and the recording of these acts is automatically a crime. See further S Ost, Child Pornography and 
Sexual Grooming: Legal and Societal Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp 31-32. 
10 See the literature referred to above, n 2. 
11 For literature on how restorative justice initiatives can reintegrate and rehabilitate offenders, see McAlinden, 




victims, suggesting a paradigm of reparation that sets out what should be achieved in this 
regard. This reveals that financial redress for these victims is radically different from standard 
kinds of compensation and should reflect both the harm and wrong committed in order to be 
symbolically significant. Section 3 explores the practical and theoretical inadequacies of 
existing legal avenues for redress. First, it discusses the possible avenues for reparation under 
the criminal and civil law in England and Wales from those who have caused harm to the 
child. It illuminates the difficulties posed by the complex array of persons and mechanisms 
that contribute to the causation of this harm and thereby demonstrates how the existing law 
fails to capture much of the harm and wrong that victims suffer. Secondly, it explores the 
model of restitution for victims of child sexual exploitation offences crafted in the USA. It 
becomes apparent that a straightforward legal transplant of the American model into this 
country would be impracticable and ill-advisable. In particular, difficulties associated with 
the twin concepts of causation and remoteness of damage can also clearly be evinced from 
the American experience. In the concluding section, a new mode of restorative justice for 
victims of CP is sketched. It is explained why a model of restorative justice involving 
diversion from the criminal justice system would be inappropriate and what the outlines of a 
scheme of material reparation might look like. Finally, to facilitate victims’ restoration in the 
broader context, it is emphasised that there are other significant matters which must also be 
tackled in order to deal with the harm done.12    
 
 
1. THE HARMFULNESS OF CP AS VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
                                                          
12 It is important to emphasise that all potential avenues for reparation require that the victim is identifiable and 
can be found, a matter that will be returned to in the final section. 
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Restorative justice approaches such as that advocated in this paper provide a response to 
crime premised on ‘the fact that one person has been harmed by the wrongful actions of 
another’13 and seek to redresses the harm caused.14 This necessitates a detailed consideration 
of the harm CP victims suffer at the outset in order to ascertain their specific needs and how 
those who have caused their harm can help address this harm.15 CP involves the exploitation 
of children by numerous individuals.16 It is often preceded and facilitated by a process of 
grooming perpetrated by the abuser and designed to gradually desensitise the child to sexual 
abuse.17 This manipulative process is itself harmful and exploitative since the groomer: takes 
advantage of the child’s trust and vulnerability; may show them CP images to help convince 
them that there is nothing wrong in what they are asking them to do; and a previously 
groomed child is more susceptible to future sexual abuse by others.18 Those who 
subsequently sexually abuse children and then record this abuse cause serious, enduring 
physical and mental harm to the children involved.19 Moreover, the existence of a 
photographic record of the abuse can serve ‘to perpetuate the images and the memory of that 
abuse’.20 In a study involving counselling and trauma therapists who had treated 76 victims 
of CP, it was found that all victims ‘suffered from feelings of shame, hate and disgust or 
loathing’, and the therapists revealed the victims’ ‘higher susceptibility to post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression and psychoses’.21  
                                                          
13 G Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002) p 64. 
14 McAlinden above n 2, p 2. 
15 S. Sharpe, ‘The Idea of Reparation’, in G Johnstone and DW Van Ness (eds), Handbook of Restorative 
Justice (Cullompton: Willan, 2007) p 24, p 30. 
16 On such exploitation, see Ost, above n 9, ch 3. 
17 Ost, ibid, pp 32-39 and 47. 
18 A-M McAlinden, ‘Grooming’ and the Sexual Abuse of Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 
129-130; and Ost, ibid and pp 136-137. 
19 For this reason, it has been argued that terms such as ‘abusive images of children’ are more appropriate than 
‘CP’ (see Taylor and Quayle, above n 4, p 7). Nonetheless, the latter is used in this paper as it is a commonly 
recognised term, popularly understood to relate to images involving sexual abuse (see Ost, ibid, pp31-32). On 
the effects of child sexual abuse on victims, see D Finkelhor, Child Sexual Abuse: New Theory and Research 
(New York: The Free Press, 1984). 
20 Taylor and Quayle, ibid, p 24. See also Ost, above n 9, pp 118-120. 
21 J von Weiler, A Haardt-Becker and S Schule, ‘Care and Treatment of Child Victims of Child Pornographic 




The severity of the harm caused to CP victims by abusers and those who record the abuse 
can be illuminated further by applying a living-standard analysis of harm caused by criminal 
offences.22 In proposing a model which enables the gravity of harms to be compared, von 
Hirsch and Jareborg put forward a scale detailing four living standard levels that can be 
intruded upon by crime: (1) subsistence; (2) minimal well-being; (3) adequate well-being; 
and (4) enhanced well-being. Gravely harmful crimes such as murder affect the interests 
required for living standard (1) and can do so to the extent that they can deprive an individual 
of his life.23 Level (2) is defined as ‘a minimal level of comfort or dignity’, and includes 
‘some degree of privacy and personal autonomy’ and not suffering ‘grossly demeaning’ 
treatment.24 Level (3) relates to ‘maintenance of an “adequate” level (but no more) of 
comfort and dignity’ and level (4) to ‘significant enhancement in quality of life above the 
mere “adequate” level’.25 von Hirsch and Jareborg also introduce four interest dimensions 
that crimes intrude upon: physical integrity; material support and amenity; freedom from 
humiliation; and privacy/autonomy.26 The sexual abuse experienced by CP victims and the 
recording of it seriously intrude upon three of these four interests: physical integrity; freedom 
from humiliation; and privacy/autonomy.27 Victims’ living standards are affected at level (2) 
(minimal well-being) for they are deprived of a minimal level of comfort and dignity and 
receive grossly demeaning treatment. Consequently, the harm caused should be defined as 
serious.28 
 
                                                          
22 A von Hirsch and N Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’ (1991) 11 OJLS 1. 
23 Ibid, p 18. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, pp 18 and 19. 
26 Ibid, p 20. 
27 See AA Gillespie, Child Pornography: Law and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p 31. 
28 von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 22, p 29. 
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Children who feature in CP are also victims of those who distribute and download images. 
Turning, first, to the harm that distributors and downloaders cause, it is exclusively 
psychological in nature, occurring when victims are aware of the distribution and 
downloading of the images by others.29 Considering again the interest dimensions that von 
Hirsch and Jareborg argue crimes intrude upon, dissemination and downloading impact upon 
CP victims’ health (physical integrity) if their awareness of the availability of the images 
causes them to suffer mental distress, and also intrude upon their freedom from humiliation 
and privacy/autonomy.30 Yet as a matter of law and certain criminal law theory, 
dissemination and downloading can be perceived to amount to more remote, secondary forms 
of harm31 since they are both parasitic upon the initial abuse. Conceptualising the harm as a 
secondary harm has the potential to trivialise and downgrade the effects on the victim, 
however, because of the possible impression that it constitutes a ‘lesser’ harm. In contrast, 
when applying the lens of restorative justice, a fundamental concern is that we take full 
account of the effects of crime upon the victim, including psychological and emotional 
harm.32 Adopting such a tailored approach, the significance of the psychological harm that 
the CP victim suffers is emphasised, as is the fact that the psychological harm caused is 
ongoing once images have been made available on the internet.33 Consequently, a distinctive 
feature of the harm suffered by CP victims who are aware that the images are available for 
others to view is that their abusive experience and exploitation continues; there is no closure. 
As Leonard explains: 
 
                                                          
29 For empirical evidence of this harm see von Weiler et al., above n 21, p 216 and M Leonard, ‘“I did what I 
was directed to do but he didn’t touch me”: The impact of being a victim of internet offending’ (2010) 16 
Journal of Sexual Aggression 249, p 252.  
30 [D]istribution of [CP] violates ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters...’ New York 
v Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982), 759 n 10 per White J.  
31 See, e.g., D Baker, ‘The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms’ (2007) 10 New Criminal Law Review 
370. 
32 Sharpe, above n 15, p 30; Johnstone, above n 13, p 64; MS King, ‘Restorative Justice, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emotionally Intelligent Justice’ (2008) 32 Melb Univ Law Rev 1096, p 1098. 
33 See Leonard, above n 29, p 249.  
9 
  
[Victims] are fully aware that they cannot remove the pictures from the internet... we 
cannot approach [them] as post trauma as they are still very much living and experiencing 
the trauma... at any time, on any day, in any country someone... could be looking at the 
pictures of them and using them as sexual stimulus for their own self-gratification.34 
 
This suggests that the acts of distributors and downloaders are capable of affecting victims’ 
living standards at level (2) (minimal well-being) and that the harm is serious. However, an 
issue that warrants consideration in the context of distribution and downloading is that of 
factual causation because, unless the victim is aware of a particular instance of such 
behaviour, it is impossible to argue that the individual who distributed or downloaded on that 
occasion (rather than any other) caused the victim’s psychological harm.35 But research 
reveals that what does occur is a form of cumulative causation which all distributors and 
downloaders contribute to. Victims are ‘continually traumatized’ by the awareness that others 
could be viewing the images.36 Theirs is a distinctive, collectively caused harm contributed to 
by a number of individuals at different times and places. Individual acts of distributing and 
downloading are therefore causative, although one such act in itself may be independently 
insufficient to cause the victim’s psychological harm. Taking a strict approach to causation 
which fails to recognise such cumulative causation, and thereby fails to connect this harm 
with distributors and downloaders, would not satisfy the imperative of restorative justice to 
recognise who has caused the victim’s psychological harm and to require that those persons 
                                                          
34 Leonard, above n 29, p 254. See also J Martin, ‘Child Sexual Abuse Images Online: Implications for Social 
Work Training and Practice’ (2014) British Journal of Social Work 1, 8; von Weiler et al., above n 21, p 216. 
35 The difficulties this poses for victims when it comes to satisfying established legal principles of causation 
under existing potential avenues for redress will be discussed in the next section. 
36 Leonard, above n 29, p252; CG Svedin and C Back, Why Didn’t They Tell Us? On Sexual Abuse in Child 
Pornography (Stockholm: Rädda Barnen, 2003) pp 65-66.  
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make reparation.37 It would be at odds with the notion that ‘reparation locates 
responsibility’.38 
 
Turning, secondly, to the wrongs occasioned by distributors and downloaders, their 
intrusion upon CP victims’ privacy and dignity is part and parcel of their abrogation of 
Kant’s second categorical imperative which insists that a rational human agent must treat 
people always as an end and never as a mere means to an end.39 Distributors exploit the 
child’s abuse by making it accessible for others to view and download, and those who seek 
out such images take advantage of the child for their own sexual gratification. Notably, these 
are wrongs that can occur even without the victim being aware of them.40 Indeed, if the focus 
is on the injury or wrong involved in the very acts of making available and downloading such 
images, when a victim becomes aware that this has occurred, she discovers that she has 
already suffered an injury for which a remedy is needed. The case for this remedy being one 
of financial reparation will now be made. 
 
 
2. THE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF FINANCIAL REDRESS FOR CP VICTIMS: A PARADIGM OF 
MATERIAL REPARATION 
 
                                                          
37 Sharpe, above n 15, p 30. 
38 Sharpe, ibid, p 29. 
39 I Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in I Kant and MJ Gregor (ed), Practical Philosophy: (The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 37. 
40 For a full account of the wrongfulness entailed in violating another’s privacy rights, even though the victim 
remains ignorant of this fact, see NA Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Privacy in English Law’ [2014] CLJ 
350, pp 352-355.  
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Financial redress as of right for the harm and wrong suffered by victims of crime has been 
recognised as a central tenet of restorative justice,41 as has ‘encouraging appropriate forms of 
reparation by offenders towards their victim’.42 This is not to say that restorative justice is 
only concerned with securing material reparation for victims. The idea of restoring victims 
has also been understood as repairing the relationship between victim and offender43 and 
some restorative justice models are focused on restoring offenders through encouraging 
offender responsibility and reintegration into society.44 However, this paper is not directed to 
the former since the conception of repairing a relationship does not fit well in any CP context 
which features numerous offenders with whom the child has no relationship; nor is it directed 
towards the matter of reintegrating offenders as its concern is restoring victims. It takes the 
stance that the primary objective must lie with ‘vindicating the harms suffered by victims… 
and then, second, with rehabilitating offenders’.45 As such, its restorative justice approach is 
victim-oriented.46 
 
 In light of the above analysis of the effects that CP crimes have on victims, a two-limbed 
paradigm of financial reparation which takes into account these harms and wrongs can be 
suggested: 
 
(i) The victim has suffered a quantifiable harm which can be at least partly redressed by a 
monetary payment. In terms of possible redress, this harm could involve personal injury 
(physical and ongoing mental injury caused by the sexual abuse, the recording of this 
                                                          
41 H Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Scottdale PA: Herald Press, 1990) p26; 
Hudson, above n 2, p 254. See also R Barnett, ‘Restitution: A New Paradigm in Criminal Justice’ (1976) 87 
Ethics 279. 
42 McAlinden (2008), above n 2, p 2. 
43 See, eg, K Pranis, ‘Restorative Values’ in Johnstone and Van Ness, above n 15, p 59. 
44 McAlinden (2007) and (2008), above nn 2 and 11. For an informative discussion of the different approaches, 
see Cossins, above n 2, pp 360-362. 
45 Daly, above n 2, p 84 (emphasis in original). 
46 Johnstone, above n 13, p 83. For a critique of restorative justice approaches which place ‘victims in the 
service of offenders’, see Davis, above n 8, pp 165-167. 
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abuse, and awareness of the image’s availability for countless others to view and 
download) and financial costs (such as counselling costs and loss of earnings if her ability 
to work is affected).  
 
(ii) The victim has suffered a wrong (her privacy and dignity47 have been violated and her 
abusive experience taken advantage of) which cannot be materially repaired or 
compensated, but for which a kind of moral reparation that involves a manifest recognition 
of the wrong, might be possible. Monetary payment from the offender can offer such 
reparation and carries a significant symbolic meaning, being ‘tantamount to inviting the 
offender to admit to the victim that he was in the wrong’.48 
 
This draws attention to an important characteristic of CP cases that differentiates them from 
many other crimes, such as criminal damage or theft. In CP cases, it is impossible to ascribe a 
precise monetary value to the wrong that has been perpetrated. For this reason, financial 
reparation goes beyond simple compensatory aspirations and possesses an important 
symbolic aspect, especially, if such payments are made by the offender.49 In other words, 
financial redress can be understood to provide reparation to the victim if we focus on its 
association with the wrong done by the offender.50 This undoubtedly makes such reparations 
radically unlike standard kinds of compensation. Whilst the same argument might be made in 
the broader context of victims of sexual assault, the added dimension of CP within the sexual 
exploitation that victims experience calls for a distinctive legal response. 
                                                          
47 It is recognised that there is no freestanding right to privacy or dignity at law, and thus the concepts are used 
in non-legal terms here. See, however, Section 2(B)(ii) for analysis of both concepts in relation to the tort of 
misuse of private information. 
48 J van Dijk, ‘Ideological Trends within the Victims Movement’ in M Maguire and J Pointing (eds), Victims of 
Crime: A New Deal? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988) p 125. See also Sharpe, above n 15, p 27. 
49 See generally RA Duff, ‘Repairing Harms and Answering for Wrongs’ in J Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p 212, p 227. 
50 Ibid, p221. See also L Zedner, ‘Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?’ (1994) 57 MLR 228, pp 




It would no doubt be easier to calculate a monetary value for reparation under the first 
limb of the paradigm than under the second limb,51 and matters are further complicated 
because actual cases are not likely to fit either limb in its pure form. Although it might be 
possible to offer separate payments for the harm referred to in (i) and the wrong stated in (ii), 
the two cannot necessarily be clearly separated ‘for the wrong partly constitutes the relevant 
harm… when the harm is manifest in the victim’s psychological suffering… [t]he victim’s 
[distress] or fear expresses his understanding of what he suffered as a wrong…’.52 
Notwithstanding this, identifying the wrong alongside the harm which is caused and the 
paradigm of reparation which follows illustrates the purpose - the symbolic significance - that 
financial reparation serves for CP victims. That said, whilst this paper adopts an approach 
that prioritises financial reparation, and research suggests that such reparation is important to 
victims of crime,53 the claim is not that material reparation in and of itself will fulfil the aim 
of restoring victims.54 A mode of reparation that could capture the harm and wrong laid out 
in the previous section and take forward the paradigm of reparation advocated in this section 
will be outlined in Section 4. However, prior to this, it is necessary to explore existing 
avenues for redress here and elsewhere and to demonstrate how these avenues are inadequate 
in providing suitable reparation for CP victims. 
 
                                                          
51 Albeit that the ongoing nature of the psychological harm adds to the complexity of deciding upon an 
appropriate monetary value. Although each case is specific to its facts, in RAR v GGC [2012] EWHC 2338 
(QB) offers an example of how damages for the harm caused were calculated in a case involving CP. 
52 RA Duff, ‘Restoration and Retribution’ in A von Hirsch, J Roberts et al (eds), Restorative Justice and 
Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Oxford: Hart, 2003) p 43, p 48. 
53 Davis, above n 8, pp 170-171.  
54 Johnstone, above n 13, p 63. Focusing on how to restore CP victims is in keeping with the notion of 
‘kaleidoscopic justice’ that McGlynn has argued should lie at the centre of the response to sexual violence 
victims, for whom justice is ‘lived and on-going’. See C McGlynn, ‘Kaleidoscopic Justice: Justice and Victim 
Survivors of Sexual Violence’, at https://prezi.com/6mguhkw1tkre/kaleidoscopic-justice-making-sense-of-the-
lived-complexitie/ (last visited 9 December 2015). See Section 4 for consideration of how the utilisation of 





3. THE WAY IN WHICH HARM IS CONSTRUED AND MIGHT BE REDRESSED THROUGH LEGAL 
AVENUES FOR REPARATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND THE USA 
 
This section discusses the possible avenues for reparation in the context of the most 
appropriate party(ies) from whom to seek financial redress under the criminal law, or against 
whom to bring the civil action for damages in England and Wales, before exploring how CP 
victims might receive compensation in the USA. It reflects upon the question of whether 
these existing avenues capture the harm and wrong caused to the child and the likelihood of 
victims receiving reparation. It turns first to the possibilities offered through the criminal law 
in England and Wales.  
 
(A) Compensation under the Criminal Law in England and Wales 
(i) Criminalised behaviour in relation to CP 
The wrong and harm caused to victims noted above are recognised by the legislature and 
courts. The initial legislative response in 1978 was to criminalise the taking of an indecent 
photograph of a child, the distribution or showing of such a photograph and the possession of 
such a photograph with a view to distribution.55 Criminalisation was subsequently extended 
to cover possession in and of itself;56 pseudo-photographs and computerised photographs and 
electronic data capable of being converted into photographs;57 other behaviour related to 
encouraging, arranging or causing the involvement of a child in pornography;58 indecent 
                                                          
55 Protection of Children Act 1978, s.1. Knowingly downloading indecent images is commonly treated as the 
offence of making indecent images: R v Smith, R v Jayson [2002] EWCA Crim 683, although it as treated as 
possession for sentencing purposes. See Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences: Definitive Guideline (London: 
HMSO, 2013) p 76. 
56 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s160. 
57 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s7(4) and (7). 
58 Child sexual exploitation offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA), ss48-50. 
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photographs and pseudo-photographs of children aged sixteen and seventeen;59 and, most 
recently, non-photographic, pornographic images of children.60  
 
Throughout this period of expanding criminalisation, judges have noted the harm-based 
rationale for CP offences in a way that resonates with a restorative justice conception of 
harm. For example, in R v Beaney, Keith J commented that: ‘... the offences which 
[downloaders] commit can properly be said to contribute to the psychological harm which the 
children in those images would suffer by virtue of the children’s awareness that there were 
people out there getting a perverted thrill from watching them forced to pose and behave in 
this way’.61 Moreover, many of the aggravating factors to be taken into account in 
determining sentences in CP cases relate to the victim’s harm.62 But does this recognition of 
the harm suffered mean that judges are likely to require the defendant to provide the victim 
with financial redress as part of the sentencing package imposed? 
 
(ii) Reparation by way of a compensation order (from the abuser/creator, distributor and 
downloader)  
In any criminal case where a victim suffers personal injury,63 loss or damage resulting from 
the offence, the court must consider making a compensation order.64 Compensation orders 
operate as an ancillary order to the principal sentence in criminal proceedings in order to 
bring reparation to the victim rather than to punish the offender,65 thereby reflecting 
                                                          
59 By virtue of the SOA, s45. 
60 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss62-68. For analysis see S Ost, ‘Criminalising Fabricated Images of Child 
Pornography: A Matter of Harm or Morality?’ (2010) 30(2) LS 230.  
61 [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 82 [9] per Keith J. 
62 See Sentencing Council, above n 55, p 78; Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences Guideline Consultation 
(London: HMSO, 2012) pp 12, 77 and 78. 
63 Including suffering by way of distress and anxiety: Bond v Chief Constable of Kent (1982) 4 Cr. App. R. (S) 
314.  
64 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCCSA), s130(1) and (2A). 
65 See further A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6th edn, 
2010) p 342; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s142(1)(e). 
16 
  
restorative justice principles. It is for the court to decide what amount is appropriate, having 
considered any evidence and representations made by the defence or prosecution and the 
defendant’s means.66 It is thus clear that the objective of restorative justice is constrained by 
practical and realistic concerns pertaining to the likelihood of the victim actually receiving 
the compensation. Failure to comply with a compensation order can lead to imprisonment, 
thus some kind of symbolic significance to the victim might be felt through extended 
imprisonment for the defendant who refuses to pay. But such symbolic significance is not 
experienced by the victim in cases where the judge chooses not to make a compensation 
order because the defendant cannot pay. 
 
Case law has made it clear that the making of compensation orders would be inappropriate 
where there is uncertainty regarding the extent of any injury or damage, with such inquiries 
being better left to civil proceedings.67 In addition, whilst it is not necessary to establish that 
the loss resulted solely from the offence in question, it must ‘fairly be said to result from the 
offence’.68 This does not bode well for cases involving CP convictions where assessing the 
particular defendant’s contribution to the victim’s overall harm is difficult. For instance, it 
may be that the offence in question is distributing the CP image. The child’s mental suffering 
might be the result of a combination of the actual abuse, the recording of that abuse, the 
awareness that the image has been distributed by the offender and is now possessed by others 
who have downloaded it, and his understanding of the wrong committed against him (a 
combination of the damage identified in the proposed paradigm). Moreover, there may well 
be numerous offences and offenders acting independently from one another,69 including 
individuals who are not yet known and will never be known if their criminal behaviour goes 
                                                          
66 PCCSA, s130(4) and (11); R v Webb (1979) 1 CrAppR (S) 16. 
67 R v Donovan (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192, [4] per Eveleigh LJ. 
68 Rowlston v Kenny (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 85, CA. 
69 Cf. the offence of affray and, e.g., R v Taylor (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 276. 
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undetected. Consequently, the percentage of the overall harm caused by the defendant cannot 
easily be calculated.  
 
This suggests that judges are less likely to make a compensation order in the case of a 
distributor or downloader than a creator who abused the child, because the child’s harm is 
easier to attribute to the latter. Additionally, it is unusual for such orders to be made in CP 
cases. From 1985 to 2011, a compensation order was included in the sentence passed in just 
fifty-two cases involving indecent photographs of children.70 In part, the paucity of 
compensation orders in CP cases may be attributable to the fact that these cases tend to 
involve numerous images and victims’ identities often remain unknown.71 It might also be 
because of a perception that financial compensation is not considered appropriate in such 
cases.72  
 
In sum, because of the nature of the criminal process and judicial discretion regarding 
sentencing, whether a compensation order is made is out of the victim’s hands. Despite 
judicial recognition of the harm that CP victims suffer, they are unlikely to receive any 
reparation via a compensation order under the existing system, with the chances being 
somewhat more in their favour if the defendant is their (financially solvent) abuser. 
 
                                                          
70 Personal communication from the Ministry of Justice dated 16 January 2013 (968-12 FOI 79753) and 13 
January 2014 (1012-13 FOI 87598), on file with author. To put this into proportion, there were 7594 
convictions for these offences between 1994-2007 (Gillespie, above n 27, p 6). More broadly, compensation 
orders were only awarded in 3.5 per cent of Crown Court cases in 2013. See Ministry of Justice, Criminal 
Justice Statistics Quarterly: December 2013: Sentencing Tables (2014), Table A5.17 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-december-2013 (last visited 9 
December 2015). 
71 The high number of cases in which victims are not identified has recently been noted by the Sentencing 
Council. See Sentencing Council, above, n 62, p 77. 
72 This perception may have been encouraged by seemingly contradictory parts of the (now replaced) 
Sentencing Guidelines Council’s Definitive Guideline for the SOA offences. See Sentencing Guidelines 
Council (SGC), Sexual Offences Act 2003: Definitive Guideline (London: HMSO, 2007) pp 108-114 and para 




(iii) Reparation through an application to the Criminal Injury Compensation Authority for 
compensation (for sexual abuse) 
The state’s Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (CICS) enables victims to recover 
compensation for ‘crimes of violence’ (including sexual assault) by applying to the Criminal 
Injury Compensation Authority (CICA).73 Awards for sexual assault take account of mental 
trauma besides physical and mental injuries74 and, specifically, awards range from £1,000 to 
£44,000 in the case of a sexual offence against a child.75  
 
Whilst making CP or arranging or causing a child to be sexually exploited through 
involvement in pornography might amount to crimes of violence if violence or aggression 
against the child is used, it is highly doubtful that offences related to distribution or 
downloading (which are obviously not contact offences)76 would. Johnson has argued that 
these offences should amount to crimes of violence since CP ‘is a crime of sexual 
exploitation, which can only take place by the abuse of children... The harm done to the child 
is the repeated invasion of the child’s privacy’.77 But the difficulty is demonstrating how 
repeatedly invading a child’s privacy is encapsulated by the CICS’s construction of violent 
harm. If distributing and downloading images constitute crimes of violence, this would 
presumably mean that voyeurism could also be such a crime, which surely cannot be 
correct.78  
 
                                                          
73 Ministry of Justice, The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (London: HMSO, 2012); Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority, A Guide to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (London: HMSO, 
2012) section 2[4] and [10].  
74 Ibid, section 4[3]. 
75 Ibid, Appendix 3, part B, 90-91. 
76 Notwithstanding this, in cases where the offender is over eighteen and has been sentenced to at least twelve 
months imprisonment, distributors and downloaders must comply with sex offender notification requirements. 
See SOA, Sched 3, [13] and [15]. 
77 Johnson, above n 3. 
78 See also D Miers, ‘Compensating Deserving Victims of Violent Crime: the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme 2012’ (2014) 34(2) LS 242, p 250. 
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Following the introduction of the much-reduced CICS,79 any extension to the 
understanding of a crime of violence would not be accepted easily. Moreover, even if CP 
offences were to be construed as crimes of violence, the CICS may not offer an appropriate 
means of reparation since it could appear to all parties involved as being akin to a state 
welfare payment rather than redress which recognises the offender’s responsibility for the 
victim’s harm.80 It would thereby fail to reflect restorative justice principles and the moral 
reparation outlined in the second limb of the paradigm suggested earlier. Indeed, in the 
broader context, victims have cited a preference for receiving financial redress from 
offenders rather than the state.81 
 
(B) Civil actions under the law in England and Wales 
Seeking damages under the civil law may appear to be a less effective way for a CP victim to 
obtain reparation because, first, damages could have less of a symbolic value than financial 
redress paid by the defendant in recognition of the criminal wrong he has committed against 
the child. Secondly, the victim may not feel able to pursue a private claim: such an action 
could add to her mental suffering, and there is the significant matter of how her legal costs 
will be met.82 However, the lower burden of proof in civil law could be a possible advantage. 
Further, some victims might feel more empowered if they are able to pursue a civil action,83 
and damages awards may be greater than those under the CICS because the CICA’s tariff 
scheme is capped and, unlike the situation with compensation orders, the judge will not take 
                                                          
79 Ibid, p 250. 
80 Johnstone, above n 13, p 74. 
81 H Strang, Repair or Revenge? Victims and Restorative Justice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002) p 17. 
82 Legal aid can be made available in cases involving child abuse, but it is not granted as of right. Even in a ‘no 
win no fee’ arrangement, successful claimants must now pay after-the-event insurance premium out of their 
compensation (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s44). 
83 See Duff, above n 49, p 219. 
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into account the defendant’s ability to pay.84 But pursuing reparation through civil law 
damages is only likely to provide reparation where the perpetrator has personal assets.85 
 
A successful claim in a tort action could result in the victim recovering general damages 
for damage presumed to flow from the wrong, including pecuniary losses such as loss of 
earnings and non-pecuniary losses for pain and suffering. It may also be possible to recover 
exemplary (punitive) damages to punish and deter if the defendant was aware or recklessly 
disregarded the fact that his conduct was illegal in seeking to profit at the child’s expense.86 
What is more, infringements of dignity, such as that which occur in the CP context, might be 
compensated by aggravated damages,87 thus offering a potential means of realising the 
second limb of the reparation paradigm proposed earlier. 
 
In what follows, the possible avenues offered by the torts of battery, the misuse of private 
information, and damages under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Data 
Protection Act 1998 are considered.  
 
(i) Damages for sexual assault and the recording of this abuse (from the abuser/creator) 
                                                          
84 See P Case, Compensating Child Sexual Abuse in England and Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) p 37; Ashworth, above n 65, p 325. 
85 As exemplified by A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6. The principle of vicarious liability might be invoked to target a 
wealthier defendant (see, eg, Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. However, such an action would only 
be available in a case where the unauthorised acts are ‘inextricably interwoven’ with the duties of employment 
(per Lord Hutton, at 229). It is therefore very unlikely that the principle could be invoked where, e.g., an 
individual has distributed CP from, or downloaded images onto, his employer’s computer. 
86 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1227 (Lord Devlin’s second class of cases in which exemplary damages 
could be awarded); John v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1996] 3 WLR 593. 
87 See Rookes v Barnard, ibid, 1221 per Lord Devlin. Such damages have been awarded in, for instance, the 
torts of battery (eg, Appleton v Garrett [1996] 5 PIQR P1) and the misuse of private information (e.g., 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22). See J Murphy, ‘The Nature and Domain of Aggravated Damages’ 
(2010) 69 CLJ 353, 358. 
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The traditional civil law route under which children who have been sexually abused bring an 
action against their abuser is under battery for sexual assault.88 Battery requires no damage to 
be established and, if the defendant has been convicted, the victim could rely on the 
conviction as evidence of the facts.89 An action could be pursued where the individual who 
creates the CP has also physically abused the child, for it is axiomatic that battery involves 
touching the victim (thus excluding mere voyeurism or non-contact photography), and RAR v 
GGC evidences that compensation for the taking of images could be provided by way of 
aggravated damages.90 As noted above, case law has made clear that in less straightforward 
cases, it would be appropriate for the victim to seek damages through the civil law rather than 
for a compensation order to be made in criminal proceedings. Less straightforward cases 
could include ones where the child was abused by multiple abusers who have created images. 
Here, ascertaining the amount that a particular abuser has contributed to the victim’s overall 
harm would certainly be more difficult and a civil law action thus more apt because joint 
tortfeasors are each liable for the whole of the damage inflicted.91   
 
An action for battery against the creator/abuser is by far the most straightforward avenue 
for reparation open to CP victims. In cases of distribution and downloading images, whether 
a victim could sue is less clear-cut. In England and Wales, the current law offers little by way 
of any certain legal actions. It is also important to bear in mind the obvious point that in order 
to sue any given distributor or downloader, the child would first have to identify that 
individual as the wrongdoer. The distributor or downloader(s) may well be impossible to 
identify if their criminal behaviour has not been detected and the victim has not been linked 
                                                          
88 Case, above, n 84, pp 54-59. 
89 On the limitation period, see Civil Evidence Act 1968, ss11 and 33; CXX v DXX [2012] EWHC 1535 (QB); 
RAR v GGC [2012] EWHC 2338 (QB). 
90 Ibid. 




to the images in question. However, in cases where distributor or downloader identification 
has occurred, the possibilities and necessary modification of legal principle and/or distorted 
representation of the damage done in the CP context that would be involved will now be 
briefly explored. 
 
(ii) Damages for the misuse of private information (from the creator and distributor) 
Following case law,92 a CP victim could argue that she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding the image of her sexual abuse. The CP victim’s private information is 
misused by individuals who create and distribute the image and, because the image is 
improperly and unlawfully obtained, the distributer could not raise a defence if the image was 
already in the public domain prior to his distribution of it.93 There is clearly no public interest 
in the image being disseminated. Indeed, given that account is taken of all the circumstances 
in deciding whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists,94 the CP victim would surely 
have a stronger case than JK Rowling’s son under this cause of action following the taking 
and publication of photographs of him in a public place.95 Could any information be said to 
be more private than that contained within a recording of a child being sexually abused, and 
the taking of such a photograph any more intrusive?  
 
The tort of misuse of private information has been said to be ‘fast developing’96 and the 
tort’s advancement by way of application to the CP context seems clearly apt. Consider also 
the judicial rationale cited for the extension of privacy rights beyond breach of confidence - 
that ‘the law is concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-
                                                          
92 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; Murray v Express Newspapers [2008] EWCA Civ 446; Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777. 
93 D v L [2004] EMLR 1 [23]. 
94 Ibid, [36]. 
95 Murray, above n 92. 
96 D v L, above n 93 [11], per Nicholls LJ. 
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esteem’.97 There is an obvious connection here with a restorative justice notion of harm and 
recognition of the wrong associated with the behaviour. Moreover, ‘where fundamental 
values and essential aspects of private life are at stake’,98 state obligations under Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights could extend into the sphere of relations of 
individuals between themselves. Thus, a failure to extend this cause of action to CP victims 
could lead to the contention that the protection offered against this wrongdoing through the 
civil law is inadequate and, therefore, a breach of Article 8.  
  
If such a case were to be successfully brought, damages could be awarded in respect of 
distress and loss of dignity,99 but the issue of the proportion of damage caused might be 
relevant in the distributor’s case if others have already made the image available. More 
importantly, it does not sit comfortably to frame the wrong caused to CP victims primarily as 
the misuse of private information. It captures some of the wrong which forms the basis of the 
second limb of the paradigm proposed earlier but not all of it, failing to convey the 
wrongdoer’s taking advantage of the child’s sexual abuse and his contribution to the ongoing 
nature of the child’s suffering. It is also inappropriate to condense the harm and wrong done 
to victims in this way.  
 
(iii) Damages for harassment under the Protection From Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA) (from 
the distributor) 
The civil wrong of harassment under the PFHA requires a course of conduct amounting to 
harassment which the individual knows amounts to such.100 Harassment includes alarming a 
                                                          
97 Mosely, above, n 92, [7] per Eady J. See also Campbell, above, n 92, [50] and [51] per Hoffman LJ. 
98 X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235. 
99 Mosely, above, n 92, [216]. 
100 PRHA s1(1). 
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person or causing them distress.101 The conduct must be ‘oppressive and unreasonable’102 and 
it suffices if it is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress.103 Damages can 
be sought for anxiety caused by the harassment and any consequent financial loss.104 In 
interpreting ‘course of conduct’,105 it has been suggested that ‘taking... an image, printing it, 
uploading and downloading are all separate acts’.106 If this is accepted, the PFHA may apply 
to the individual who commits all, or some, of these acts, such as a distributor who uploads 
the image more than once.  
 
Further light is shed on whether distributors and downloaders could be sued under the 
PFHA by AMP v Persons Unknown.107 Here the claimant’s mobile phone, which contained 
sexually explicit photographs of her for her boyfriend’s personal use, went missing. Soon 
afterwards, the images appeared on an image-sharing website and her Facebook page was 
linked to them. The images were removed at her request; however, she was then contacted 
via Facebook by an individual who threatened to post the images online if she did not accept 
his friend request. A few months after she had refused this request, the images appeared on a 
site with her name appended to them. They were downloaded an unknown number of times 
by persons unknown. The claimant was granted an interim injunction to prevent the 
distribution of the images via downloading by persons who were unknown but traceable,108 
since there was ‘a good arguable case’ that such conduct amounted to harassment.109  
 
                                                          
101 PRHA s7(2). 
102 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Limited and another [2001] EWCA 1233, [30] per Lord Phillips MR.  
103 Dowson v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 2621 (QB), [142]. 
104 There is a six year limitation period. PRHA ss3 and 6. 
105 The course of conduct must occur on at least two occasions: PRHA s7(3)(a); Lau v DPP [2000] 1 FLR 799, 
[15]. 
106 Johnson and Wheeler, above n 3. 
107 [2011] EWHC 3454 (TCC).  
108 Ibid, [14]-[20].  
109 Ibid, [45] per Ramsay J. 
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It seems that the claimant suffered distress because of the connection that could be drawn 
between her and the images. For a CP victim, the link with the image is less conspicuous, not 
least because the original uploader will have avoided disclosing the child’s name for fear of 
enabling identification and, thus, being connected to the offence(s). However, it is submitted 
that the harassment would be less related to the image being linked to the child (although this 
possibility may add to the child’s mental distress)110 and connected more to the child’s 
awareness that the image is available for anyone to see, as discussed in the first section.  
 
The harassment in AMP was constituted by dissemination; downloaders facilitated 
distribution because the technology used by the site meant that downloading a file allowed 
pieces of that file to be uploaded by others.111 This suggests that it would be harder to prove 
that those who download CP but do not facilitate distribution commit this tort. However, 
where individuals disseminate or facilitate the dissemination of the victim’s image, the 
fulfilment of the elements of ‘oppressive and unreasonable’ conduct and conduct calculated 
in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress in AMP makes it probable that these 
requirements will be satisfied.112 This does involve a manipulation of an element of the tort 
though, since the intention of CP distributors is more likely to be the enhancement of 
reputation and/or to gain financially rather than to cause the victim distress.113 Moreover, if 
there are multiple distributors of the image, a victim will face the problem identified above of 
proving that the harm was caused by the particular defendant. Finally, considering the 
victim’s suffering, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of harassment fails to 
reflect the full nature of the wrong and harm committed. 
 
                                                          
110 See Martin, above n 34, p 8. 
111 Ibid, [12]. 
112 Ibid, [44]. 
113 Taylor and Quayle, above n 4, pp 78, 94 and 207. Although see CEOP, Threat Assessment of Child Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse (London: CEOP, 2013), p 8 [23]. 
26 
  
(iv) Damages under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) (from the creator, distributor and 
downloader) 
A final avenue for reparation might lie under the DPA. The Act applies to the processing of 
personal data, that is, information relating to a living individual who is identifiable from the 
data.114 Certain such data is ‘sensitive personal data’,115 and this is likely to include a 
photograph depicting a child engaged in sexual activity. Personal data is processed if it is 
obtained, recorded or held on any computer system, and if it is disclosed. The Act broadly 
defines a data controller as any individual who processes personal data;116 thus, an individual 
who creates CP through a computer, stores it on a computer, distributes it or acquires it 
through a computer, could be a data controller.117 Sensitive personal data should not be 
processed unless the subject gave explicit consent or there is a public interest in processing 
the data,118 neither of which would apply in the CP context.119  
 
A person who suffers damage as a consequence of a data controller’s failure to comply 
with the Act is entitled to compensation.120 Therefore, a CP victim may recover 
compensation for damage to her reputation, mental distress and financial losses, a form of 
reparation reflecting the first limb of the paradigm suggested earlier.121 However, there is the 
problem regarding who caused the harm in a case involving multiple offenders who may well 
remain unknown and this is especially so if the victim is looking to a downloader for 
                                                          
114 DPA, s1. 
115 s2(c) refers to data relating to an individual’s sexual life. 
116 Ibid. 
117 See the explanation provided by A White, ‘Data Protection and the Media’, European Human Rights Law 
Review (2003) Supp 25, 26.   
118 DPA, Sch 3 [1-10]. 
119 Other than legitimate processing of data by the police. See Protection of Children Act 1978, s1B.  
120 DPA, s13. 
121 It should be noted that there is uncertainty regarding how damage is defined for the purposes of the DPA. 
The Court of Appel held in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 that compensation could be 
awarded for distress alone without the need to prove financial loss, but this judgement is being appealed.   
27 
  
compensation.122 Whilst downloading the image is one (more than trivial) cause of the harm, 
it would be difficult to establish the required sufficiently causative link between the particular 
instance of downloading and the victim’s psychological suffering to enable recovery of 
compensation in tort. Case law suggests that causation may still be found in cases involving 
child sexual abuse despite the existence of other causes of the victim’s condition, suggesting 
the possibility of a flexible, material contribution approach to causation.123 However, proving 
that it was the particular defendant’s downloading that was a material contribution to the 
harm would be problematic. Furthermore, it is again inappropriate to condense the wrong into 
the misuse of personal data. 
 
In sum, there is no easy way for CP victims to obtain reparation from those who contribute 
to their harm in England and Wales, with the legal principle of causation posing a significant 
obstacle. What is more, the harm and wrong caused are not adequately and appropriately 
recognised by any existing legal routes to redress. Have victims fared any better under the 
notably different approach in the USA? 
 
(C) An alternative way of recognising harm and compensating CP victims? Restitution in 
criminal proceedings in the USA 
A concept of restitution focused on recovering the victim’s losses from the offender has a 
place in both American civil and criminal law.124 It is through federal restitution in criminal 
                                                          
122 As Johnson has contended might be possible under the DPA: Johnson, above, n 3. 
123 See C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) [100] and [102]. The judge applied Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw 
[1956] AC 613 and McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1. 
124 M Reid and C Collier, ‘When Does Restitution Become Retribution?’ (2012) 64 Oklahoma Law Review 653; 
J Marsh, ‘Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child Pornography Victims’ (2010-2011) 61 Syracuse 
Law Review 459. The legal conception of restitution under American law thus clearly differs from the 
conception under the law in England and Wales, which has at its base the idea of awarding the victim the 
defendant’s gain-based damages. See J Edelman, Gain Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and 
Intellectual Property (Oxford: Hart, 2002). Here, restitution is the remedy available in the entirely private law 
category of unjust enrichment. See P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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proceedings that victims of sexual exploitation offences (including CP offences)125 have been 
singled out: following any conviction for such an offence from 2006, the Mandatory 
Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act requires restitution for the ‘full amount of 
the victim’s losses’.126 This includes costs incurred by medical services, physical therapy, 
lost income and ‘any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the 
offense’.127 The victim can request that the prosecution seeks restitution, although the judge 
decides on the amount to be awarded. 
 
The most popular contemporary conception of restitution’s aim in federal criminal law is 
to compensate,128 with restitution being seen as ‘an essential element in helping victims 
reconstruct their lives in the aftermath of a crime’.129 Indeed, the ‘primary and overarching 
goal’ of mandatory restitution in criminal proceedings is ‘to fully compensate… victims for 
their losses and to restore [them] to their original state of well-being.’130 In the context of CP 
victims, the lesser claim that ‘[a]n effective restitution memorandum that… seeks mental 
health and future lost income… can aid the victim on the path to healing’131 seems to 
recognise more realistically the limits of any attempt to provide reparation to CP victims and 
thereby achieve restorative justice. It cannot be possible to put victims in the position that 
they were in prior to the wrong perpetrated upon them, but providing redress for this wrong 
can assist them in their recovery from it.  
 
                                                          
125 Such as employing or coercing ‘any minor to engage in… any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
producing any visual depiction of such conduct’ and knowingly distributing and possessing such material 
(Chapter 110 of the U.S. Code (USC), §2251(a) and §2252A).  
126 18 U.S.C. §2259(b)(1).  
127 Ibid, (b)(3). 
128 RW Jacques, ‘Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution Framework for Child Pornography 
Victims’ (2010-11) 45 Georgia Law Review 1167, 1178. The courts have also emphasised a conception of 
restitution based on rehabilitation and deterrence: Kelly v Robinson 479 U.S. 36 (1986), 49, n 10.  
129 BA Fields, ‘Restitution and Restorative Justice’ (2003) 22 Youth Studies Australia 44, 45. 
130 US v Simmonds 235 F.3d 826, 831 (3d Cir.2000) (emphasis added).  
131 A Downes, M Garvin, W Lucibello et al., ‘Assessing Current Restitution Law to Effectively Serve Victims in 
Child Abuse Imagery Cases’ (2011) 22 Update 1, 5. 
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 §2259 was originally used successfully in cases involving child sexual abuse and the 
production of CP.132 However, since 2009, two victims named ‘Amy’ and ‘Vicky’ have 
sought restitution in over 800 federal and district court cases against defendants who possess 
and distribute images featuring them.133 Courts have been sharply divided in their reactions to 
these claims. In US v Staples, Amy was awarded restitution of over $3,000,000.134 In 
contrast, in another case she and Vicky were only awarded $6,000 and $1,500 respectively,135 
and other courts rejected their claims altogether because of a failure to prove the particular 
defendant proximately caused their injuries, the difficulty of quantifying their losses, and the 
risks of overcompensation.136 For instance, in the District Court’s judgment in US v Paroline, 
it was stated that Amy’s losses ‘are generalized and caused by her initial abuse as well as the 
general existence and dissemination of her pornographic images. No effort has been made to 
show the portion of these losses specifically caused by Paroline’s possession of Amy’s two 
images.’137  
 
 One of the main controversies surrounding restitution in CP possession cases in the USA 
has, therefore, related to the complex matters of causation and remoteness.138 The approach 
of some federal courts has led to possessors being ordered to pay restitution for harm without 
the need to establish proximate causation (that is, that the damage was not too remote in the 
terminology used in England and Wales139) as required by §2259.140 There was, in fact, 
                                                          
132 D DiBari, ‘Restoring Restitution: The Role of Proximate Causation in Child Pornography Possession Cases 
Where Restitution is Sought’ (2011) 33 Cardozo Law Review 297, p 301. 
133 See further Reid and Collier, above n 124, p 657. Their lawyers receive notification when the images are 
discovered in an arrested individual’s possession by virtue of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004. 
134 2009 WL 2827204 (SD Fla Sept 2, 2009).  
135 US v Brunner 2010 WL 148433 (WDNC Jan. 12, 2010).  
136 See, eg, US v Paroline 672 F.Supp.2d 781 (2009); US v Aumais 656 F.3d 147 (2011); US v Fast 709 F.3d 
712, 722 (8th Cir. 2013); Reid and Collier, above n 124, pp 657-58. 
137 Ibid, 792 per Davis J.  
138 Other criticisms include judicial confusion as to the method of calculating restitution. See Reid and Collier, 
above n 124. 
139 ‘…[T]he requirement of proximate causation… would prevent holding any possessor liable for losses caused 
only in a remote sense’. Paroline v US 134 S.Ct. 1710 (2014), 1723, per Kennedy J. 
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controversy regarding whether proximate causation was required for all harms listed under 
§2259. In Staples,141 for instance, the District Court awarded Amy restitution against the 
defendant who had six images which featured her on his computer. A psychologist gave 
evidence as to her suffering because of the defendant’s possession of the images and this 
sufficed without the need to prove that he proximately caused the injuries. This led to the 
distinct possibility that some defendants were compensating the victim for a greater portion 
of the harm she had suffered than they themselves had caused.142 The US approach thus 
evidenced a failure to recognise what should constitute an appropriate level of reparation 
from individual offenders, taking into account their responsibility for the harm suffered by 
the victim, a position at odds with restorative justice principles.143 
 
The matter of whether victims such as Amy and Vicky can recover damages from those 
found to be in possession of their images has now been addressed by the recent Supreme 
Court ruling in Paroline v US, albeit in a less than satisfactory way.144 A narrow majority 
held that Amy’s losses resulting from the trauma of knowing that the images were being 
viewed by others were ‘direct and foreseeable results of child pornography crimes’. However, 
‘but for’ causation could not be found since ‘it is not possible to prove that her losses would 
be less… but for one possessor’s individual role in the large, loosely connected network 
through which her images circulate’.145 Thus, proximate causation was not established. Yet it 
was held that denying restitution would be at a variance with one of §2259’s penological 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
140 18 U.S.C. §2259(b)(3)(F).  
141 2009 WL 2827204 (SD Fla Sept 2, 2009). 
142 Hence, DiBari contended that in such cases finding harm is equated with finding causation. DiBari, above, n 
132, p 311. And see US v Paroline (2009), above n 136, p 791. 
143 See Sharpe, above n 15. 
144 US v Paroline, above, n 139. 
145 Ibid, 1723, per Kennedy J. Nor was it appropriate to apply a less restrictive causation standard such as the 
aggregate causation test, which would hold that each possessor ‘was part of a causal set sufficient to produce 
her ongoing trauma, so each possessor should be treated as a cause in fact of… all the attendant losses 
incurred as a result of the entire ongoing traffic in her images’ (1724). According to the majority judgment, 
this would ‘amount to holding each possessor… liable for the conduct of thousands of other independently 
acting possessors and distributors...’ (1725-1726). 
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purposes: conveying to offenders the devastating harms that their behaviour causes to real 
victims.146 If, therefore, it could be established that the defendant’s possession of images 
caused the victim to suffer loss because of the continuing traffic in her images, but the 
particular amount of those loses could not be traced back to the defendant through traditional 
causation principles, then restitution should be ordered in an amount reflecting that 
defendant’s relative role in the causal process underlying her general losses.147 Kennedy J 
suggested that factors such as whether the defendant distributed as well as possessed the 
images, the number of past defendants found to have contributed to the victim’s losses and a 
reasonably reliant estimate of the larger number of offenders involved (if available), could 
help determine the appropriate amount for a restitution award.148 He acknowledged that this 
approach would not be without its difficulties,149 and indeed, Roberts CJ noted in his dissent 
that even if it were ‘possible to project the total number of persons who have viewed Amy’s 
images, that number is tragically large, which… will lead to a pitiful recovery in every 
case’.150 That said, it might become a more feasible approach if a number of judgments 
emerge in which courts begin to set a standardised figure to reflect the extent to which 
continued trafficking in the victim’s images has contributed to the victim’s losses, and to 
appraise how much causal significance to attach to the behaviour of one individual who has 
played a role in this.151  
 
                                                          
146 Ibid, 1726. 
147 Ibid, 1727. 
148 Ibid, 1728. 
149 Ibid, 1729. 
150 Ibid, 1734.  
151 The difficulties posed by the Supreme Court’s ruling can be seen in recent federal district court cases such as 
US v Crisostomi 31 F. Supp. 3d 361, 365 (D.R.I. 2014); US v Rogers 758 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2014) and US v 
Hanlon No. 2:14-CR-18-FtM-29DNF (M.D. FL. Jan. 23, 2015). In response to the Supreme Court’s judgment, 
the Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015 (AVA) was introduced 
in January 2015 and passed by Senate in February 2015. The Act would set restitution amounts for CP victims 
and is currently being considered in the House. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/295 (last visited 9 December 2015). 
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The American approach, therefore, has been and is likely to continue to be steeped in 
controversy. In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Paroline v US it is going to be 
challenging, to say the least, to assess the level of restitution in an amount that reflects the 
defendant’s relative role in the causal process leading to the victim’s general losses. Thus, the 
endeavour of achieving appropriate reparation for the CP victim is once again made 
extremely difficult by the twin issues of causation and remoteness under the alternative US 
model of restitution.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION: SKETCHING A NEW MODE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO ADDRESS THE HARM 
CAUSED TO VICTIMS OF CP 
 
This paper has argued that the harm and wrong caused to CP victims is distinctive and this 
should be recognised in order for reparation to be both appropriate and symbolically 
significant. It has revealed that the possible avenues of redress under the current law in 
England and Wales fail to encapsulate the nature of the harm and wrong caused. It has also 
shown that these possible routes of redress and the US model of restitution are ill-suited to 
the aim of addressing the harm caused to victims because of the way in which requirements 
of causation and remoteness make it extremely difficult to attribute legal responsibility to 
downloaders in particular. In light of this analysis, this concluding section suggests what the 
outlines of a mode of reparation mirroring principles of restorative justice for CP victims 
might look like.  
 
It is necessary, initially, to consider the appropriateness of certain RJ initiatives. In order 
to ensure a suitably tailored approach for CP victims, a new mode of restorative justice 
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should not involve diversion from the criminal justice system. Much attention has been paid 
to restorative justice programmes which do involve such diversion, bringing the offender and 
victim together in an informal setting such as conferencing and mediation.152 Controversy 
continues to surround the utilisation of these initiatives in sexual offence cases153 and they do 
not form a part of the mode of reparation outlined here for a number of reasons. First, 
diverting sexual offences from the criminal justice system could send the wrong symbolic 
message, suggesting that the crime is somehow less serious.154 Although it might be 
countered that alternatives to the current criminal justice system would be less traumatic for 
sexual offence victims,155 this is much less likely to be the case for CP victims. This is due to 
a combination of: the ever-expanding criminalisation of behaviour related to CP; the severe 
judicial and societal reaction to CP offences;156 the fact that if it is proven that some kind of 
sexual activity involving a child is photographed, this automatically constitutes CP; and the 
reality that, aside from offences relating to creating CP, the victim is never involved in the 
trial process.157 It is thus harder to argue that diverting CP offences from the criminal justice 
system would be less traumatic for victims. 
 
                                                          
152 See McAlinden, above n 2, p 3. 
153 Cf. e.g., S Curtis-Fawley and K Daly, ‘Gendered Violence and Restorative Justice: the Views of Victim 
Advocates’ (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 603 and K Daly, ‘Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An 
Archival Study of Court and Conference Cases’ (2006) 46 Brit J Criminol 334, with Cossins, above n 2.  
154 See the discussion in Daly, ibid, p 338. cf A-M McAlinden, ‘Are There Limits to Restorative Justice? The 
Case of Child Sexual Abuse’ in D Sullivan and L Tifft (eds), Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2006) p 299, p 303. 
155 Daly, ibid; MP Koss, KJ Bachar and C Quince Hopkins, ‘Restorative Justice for Sexual Violence: Repairing 
Victims, Building Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable’ (2003) 989 Ann NY Acad Sci 384, p 
387. 
156 See Ost, above n 9, chs 2 and 4. However, whilst not directly relevant to the CP context, it is noted that 
teenage victims of ‘group localised grooming’ have frequently been treated as though they were on trial by the 
criminal justice system. See J Mooney and S Ost, ‘Group Localised Grooming: What is it and What 
Challenges does it Pose for Law and Society?’ (2013) 25(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 425. 
157 This is because of the nature of offences related to distribution and downloading, which do not directly 
involve the child. The offences are laid out above (Section 3(A)(i)). Also, in a trial related to the creation of 
CP, all special measures under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 would be available to 
protect CP victims. 
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Utilising initiatives such as mediation in cases involving sexual offences also raises 
concerns that bringing the offender and victim together could be harmful and serve to 
perpetuate the power dynamic between the parties, concerns which clearly resonate for CP 
victims. Hudson, for instance, notes the danger that ‘… restorative processes [c]ould 
reproduce and reinforce the imbalance of power of the crime relationship, rather than 
confronting the offender with the power of the state acting on behalf of… the victim’.158 In 
cases where the offender is the child’s abuser or the creator of the CP with whom the victim 
had a relationship, there is a risk that bringing offender and victim together will increase the 
victim’s vulnerability and re-traumatise her since, for child sex offences, ‘the essence of the 
crime is manipulation, control, self-gratification and lack of empathy’.159 Whilst in other 
contexts, the potential that an offender’s apology to his victim in a conference or mediation 
setting offers to recognise the wrong committed is apparent,160 utilising this variant of 
restorative justice could raise serious concerns for CP victims. For an offender who has 
groomed the child, it may be part of his strategy to gain access her again.161 Victims’ 
recovery may also be impaired if they come face to face with or receive a letter from those 
who have distributed or downloaded their images. Knowledge of the name and face of an 
offender previously unknown to them may exacerbate their mental distress.162 That said, 
Leonard’s research suggests that discovering the identity of perpetrators who view the images 
can assist CP victims in their recovery and, indeed, remaining unaware of perpetrators’ 
                                                          
158 Hudson, above n 2, p 247. 
159 Cossins, above n 2, p 365. It is notable that one sexual offence victim whose experience of conferencing was 
more negative than positive overall was ‘drawn into, manipulated, and groomed by [the offender] for sexual 
relations over a considerable period of time’. See K Daly and S Curtis-Fawley, ‘Justice for Victims of Sexual 
Assault: Court or Conference?’ in K Heimer and C Kruttschnitt (eds), Gender and Crime: Patterns of 
Victimization and Offending (New York: New York University Press, 2006) p 230, p 257. 
160 K Pranis, ‘Restorative Justice Values and Confronting Family Violence’, in Strang and Braithwaite, above n 
2, p 23, p 37 (emphasis added).  
161 See J Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women’s Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative Justice  in Strang 
and Braithwaite, above n 2, p 42, p 58 (in the context of men who abuse their partners). On the manipulative 
setting up of situations to enable grooming, see McAlinden, above n 18, p 126. 
162 Whilst there is currently no research to support this position, it is supported by the leading clinical 




identities is more damaging.163 There is a need for further research in this area, but even if 
other evidence were produced indicating that receiving an apology has more positive 
restorative effects for CP victims than negative effects, it will often be impossible for the 
offender to apologise since many CP victims remain unidentified, as will be discussed 
shortly. 
 
For these reasons, it would seem more appropriate for a new mode of reparation to operate 
within or alongside the formal criminal justice system, in a way that avoids bringing victim 
and offender together. Whilst recognising that further work is required to create a new model 
of restorative justice which would put into practice the paradigm of reparation that has been 
advocated,164 one possible way forward will be sketched here. A central pot of financial 
redress for CP victims could be established which all convicted offenders pay into, but which 
also receives state contributions to better guarantee the availability of sufficient funds. There 
could be set sums that defendants pay into the pot for: abuse; creation; distribution; creation 
by downloading;165 and possession of images,166 and defendants who plead guilty or are 
convicted would have to pay the set sum regardless of whether their victims are identifiable. 
The system could function in the same way as the current CICS, in that victims of CP crimes 
could apply to the scheme’s authority. Unlike the current system of compensation orders in 
criminal proceedings, this would enable the provision of material reparation where victims 
are only identified after a particular defendant’s trial. Moreover, where it is established that 
images recovered by police feature particular CP victims, these victims could apply for 
redress regardless of whether the offenders who originally created or distributed the images 
have been identified.  
                                                          
163 Leonard, above n 29, p 251. 
164 The exact nature and practicalities of such a model of reparation is the subject of the author’s ongoing 
research. 
165 See above n 56. 




There would need to be a clear explication of the nature of the harm and wrong that 
victims suffer, as illustrated in the paradigm proposed earlier, both to justify the existence of 
the scheme and to avoid the implication that material reparation in and of itself repairs the 
wrong committed. Thus, alongside personal injuries (physical harm caused by the sexual 
abuse, mental injury and psychiatric conditions), the wrong should be framed as a violation of 
privacy and dignity and, for CP victims who are aware of the availability of the image(s), 
further mental suffering, repression, feelings of shame and guilt, recurring invasions of 
privacy and violations of autonomy and dignity. Significantly, a scheme involving a central 
pot of financial redress could be advantageous because it reflects the collective responsibility 
of abusers/creators, distributors and downloaders for this overall harm caused to the victim. It 
would also avoid the difficulty of proving the percentage of particular defendants’ 
contributions to victims’ overall harm. In addition, because reparation would come from 
offenders (albeit with state support), the symbolic value of emphasising the wrong that they 
have committed against victims would be retained.  
 
However, whilst developing a scheme such as that sketched above might address the 
matter of material reparation for CP victims, financial redress must be considered alongside 
the larger question of how more can be done to aid victims’ restoration. According to the 
afore-mentioned UN Optional Protocol, ‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures with 
the aim of ensuring all appropriate assistance to victims of [CP], including… their full 
physical and psychological recovery’.167 There are two particular issues which must be 
tackled in order for the UK to fulfil this obligation: the challenges raised by victim 
                                                          
167 See above n 7, Article 9[3] (emphasis added). 
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identification and providing appropriate counselling support for those victims who are 
identified.  
 
The identification of victims is an ongoing problem168 and involves a difficult and time 
consuming process.169 Whilst a new national database was recently launched which should 
enable investigators to identify known images, classify content and flag up new images more 
efficiently, questions have been raised as to whether there are sufficient resources in place for 
the system to operate in the long-term.170 Successful victim identification also presents 
difficult ethical issues as the victim may remain unaware that her sexual abuse was recorded 
and, if it was a very young child whose sexual abuse is featured in the image, she may also be 
unaware of the actual abuse. If such a victim is identified some or perhaps many years after 
the event, ought she to be informed of the crimes committed against her by the police to 
enable her to seek reparation from the offender? This immensely difficult question raises the 
issue of the victim’s interest in knowing information pertaining to herself and her interest in 
not knowing this information.171 Her interest in knowing can be based on notions of self-
                                                          
168 G Holland, ‘Identifying Victims of Child Abuse Images: An Analysis of Successful Identifications’ in E 
Quayle and M Taylor (eds), Viewing Child Pornography on the Internet: Understanding the Offence, 
Managing the Offender, Helping Victims (Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing, 2005), p 77.  
169 See Gillespie, above n 27, pp 332-333 and 360; J Carr and Z Hilton, ‘Combating Child Abuse Images on the 
Internet: International Perspectives’ in J Davidson and P Gottschalk (eds) Internet Child Abuse: Current 
Research and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p 72.  
170 See ‘Child abuse database containing millions of images to launch’ BBC News 2 December 2014, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30175102 (last visited 9 December 2015). 
171 The right to know and the right not to know have been explored predominantly in medical law and ethics in 
relation to processing genetic information and are most commonly seen to be connected to rights of autonomy 
and privacy (see, eg, P Borry, M Shabani and HC Howard, ‘Is There a Right Time to Know? The Right Not to 
Know and Genetic Testing in Children’ (2014) 42 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 19, pp 21-22; V 
Chico, ‘Requiring Genetic Knowledge: a Principled Case for Support’ (2015) 35 LS 532). The marked 
difference is that, in the genetic context, the person who has undergone genetic testing is already aware there 
is sensitive information about herself that she may or may not wish to know. She then exercises her autonomy 
in deciding whether or not to know the results, taking into account the reasons in favour of knowing and 
against knowing. In contrast, the unaware victim of sexual abuse and CP has no knowledge of the existence of 
the information about the crimes committed against her and is therefore unable to exercise her autonomy and 
weigh up the reasons for and against knowing it without first being informed of its existence by the police. 
Thus, in order to exercise a right to know, she needs to be informed of the existence of information about 
herself and it is extremely difficult to envisage how she could be alerted to its existence without its essence 
being revealed (see G Laurie, ‘Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional and Legal 
Implications’ (2014) 42 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 53, p 54). Consequently, it would appear more 
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authorship of her life and experiences.172 This interest may lead to the argument that the 
police have a disclosure responsibility to empower her to take control over this previously 
unknown life experience and take action to bring the offender to account to her personally for 
the wrong and harm he has perpetrated. Yet the disclosure of her abuse and the CP is highly 
likely to cause serious distress and psychological harm, even if this is dealt with sensitively 
by the police.173 Thus, she also has an interest in not knowing this information in order to 
avoid the harm this knowledge will cause. There is next to no research on how to resolve this 
dilemma.174 Prior to the implementation of a reparation scheme such as that outlined above, 
research is therefore needed to ascertain whether it is appropriate to disclose the sexual abuse 
and the existence of images to unaware victims and the best way in which to do so, in order 
that police policy can offer some means to resolve the conflict between the victim’s interest 
in knowing and in not knowing.175  
 
Turning to those victims who are aware of the existence of images, whilst some will have 
come forward to disclose their abuse there will be other victims who have chosen to deal with 
what has happened to them without disclosure, for whatever reasons.176 In some such cases, 
police intervention could significantly affect victims’ ‘rights to retain control over their own 
experiences’.177 Conversely, careful and sensitive police intervention could lead to a child 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
difficult to respect the CP victim’s right to know without defeating her right not to know. Similarly, if the 
police choose to act in accordance with the CP victim’s right not to know, they deny her right to know the 
information. 
172 See, eg, J Wilson, ‘It’s Time to Stop Worrying About Paternalism in Health Policy’, in T Schramme (ed), 
New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care (London: Springer, 2015) 203, pp 214-215. 
173 See also Taylor and Quayle, above n 4, pp 206-207. 
174 T Palmer, ‘Behind the Screen: Children who are the Subjects of Abusive Images’ in Quayle and Taylor, 
above n 168, p 61, p 65: ‘[w]e know little about the impact of such a revelation on the now adult “child 
victim” and need to think strategically about why and when such a disclosure may be necessary…’. 
175 Police policy guidelines on the identification of now older victims have been said to be ‘poorly thought 
through and expressed’: Taylor and Quayle, above n 4, p 207. 
176 Reasons cited for non-disclosure in one study were ‘guilt’ and ‘fear of the threats of the perpetrator’. von 
Weiler et al., above n 21, p 213.  
177 Taylor and Quayle, above n 4, p 206. 
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disclosing abuse when, previously, he had been too scared to do so and could enable law 
enforcement to bring a perpetrator to justice.178  
 
Moreover, further investment is needed in victim counselling. There is a paucity of 
research on appropriate treatment and therapy for CP victims.179 However, according to that 
which is most recently available, therapists consider working with CP victims to be more 
complex than working with other child sexual abuse victims and ‘are still at a loss as to how 
to treat [CP victims] to the fullest extent’.180 Writing in 2014, Martin commented that there 
are ‘no evidence-based guidelines about how to respond to the victims’ and, of the fourteen 
practitioner participants in her study, only two had received training on online CP.181 Indeed, 
her ‘prevailing finding was that most practitioners did not have a clear understanding of 
[online CP] or the potential effects on child victims’.182 The general view amongst 
participants was that the usual trauma and treatment approaches for victims of child sexual 
abuse would not be sufficient for CP victims because of the added dimension of the 
permanent availability of the images online.183 Furthermore, there was a concern that if CP 
had been a component of the sexual exploitation experienced by victims whom they had 
treated, this would have been missed because ‘they would not know to ask the child about 
                                                          
178 See ‘Charity boss Simon McCarty jailed for child abuse’ BBC News 7 September 2012, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-19526503 (last visited 9 December 2015) for a case in point. 
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abuse images’.184 This suggests that inadequacies in therapists’ training may pose further 
problems for victim identification. And the matter of counselling raises once more the 
question of the victim’s interest in knowing and in not knowing: one participant was troubled 
by the ethical ramifications if their counselling revealed the existence of images to an 
unaware child.185 The limited available research on practitioners’ experiences of counselling 
CP victims therefore suggests that we cannot even begin to tackle the challenge of assisting 
victims in their recovery without better investment in training for practitioners. A new mode 
of restorative justice for CP victims would have to be responsive to this matter. 
 
In conclusion, this paper has taken the first step in the process of illustrating how 
restorative justice principles could deal with the harm caused to CP victims and shape the 
reparation that should be provided to them. A mode of reparation reflecting restorative justice 
would recognise the symbolic significance of emphasising the wrong that offenders have 
committed against victims and take into account offenders’ collective responsibility for the 
harm caused. Further steps are required in order to give fuller shape to a new model of 
material reparation that could put into practice the suggested scheme outlined here. However, 
in order to fulfil the demands of restorative justice, any such system would need to be 
accompanied by more investment in victim identification and appropriate, tailored 
counselling to facilitate victims’ restoration in the broader context. Until then, achieving 
restorative justice for victims of CP is only ever likely to be an ideal rather than a reality. 
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